Finalizing tentative matches from truncated preference lists by Tamaki, Hisao
Finalizing Tentative Matches from Truncated
Preference Lists
Hisao Tamaki
Department of Computer Science, Meiji University
tamaki@cs.meiji.ac.jp
Abstract. Consider the standard hospitals/residents problem, or the
two-sided many-to-one stable matching problem, and assume that the
true preference lists of both sides are complete (containing all mem-
bers of the opposite side) and strict (having no ties). The lists actually
submitted, however, are truncated. Let I be such a truncated instance.
When we apply the resident-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm of
Gale and Shapley to I, the algorithm produces a set of tentative matches
(resident-hospital pairs). We say that a tentative match in this set is fi-
nalizable in I if it is in the resident-optimal stable matching for every
completion of I (a complete instance of which I is a truncation). We
study the problem we call FTM (Finalizability of Tentative Matches)
of deciding if a given tentative match is finalizable in a given truncated
instance. We first show that FTM is coNP-complete, even in the stable
marriage case where the quota of each hospital is restricted to be 1.
We then introduce and study a special case: we say that a truncated in-
stance is resident-minimal, if further truncation of the preference lists of
the residents inevitably changes the set of tentative matches. Resident-
minimal instances are not only practically motivated but also useful in
computations for the general case. We give a computationally useful char-
acterization of negative instances of FTM in this special case, which, for
instance, can be used to formulate an integer program for FTM. For the
stable marriage case, in particular, this characterization yields a poly-
nomial time algorithm to solve FTM for resident-minimal instances. On
the other hand, we show that FTM remains coNP-complete for resident-
minimal instances, if the maximum quota of the hospitals is 2 or larger.
We also give a polynomial-time decidable sufficient condition for a ten-
tative match to be finalizable in the general case. Simulations show that
this sufficient condition is extremely useful in a two-round matching pro-
cedure based on FTM for a certain type of student-supervisor markets.
1 Introduction
In many matching markets in practice which are modeled by the two-sided,
many-to-one stable matching problem of Gale and Shapley [1]@(often called the
hospitals/residents problem), the task of the participants to form a preference list
is far from trivial. The large number of participants in the opposite side makes
it practically impossible to evaluate all of them in enough details to precisely
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determine the preference order. In some cases, quite costly procedures such as
interviews are involved in the evaluation process, which makes it even harder
to form a precise preference list. If each participant is required to submit a
complete preference list in such a market, then the submitted list would be
inevitably inaccurate. Otherwise, the lists submitted would be short.
In the latter case, non-negligible number of participants remain unmatched
after the matching procedure. This is the case, for example, in the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP) of the United States [4], which assigns
candidates for residency to positions in hospitals. To provide further opportu-
nities for the candidates and positions that have failed to be matched in the
main matching round called MRM (Main Residency Match), NRMP organizes
a post-match program called SOAP (Supplemental Offer and Acceptance Pro-
gram). Unfortunately, the design of this post-match program lacks a theoretical
basis. One clear drawback is that the final matching which results from the en-
tire process, MRM followed by SOAP, is not necessarily stable even under the
assumption that, for each agent, the preference list submitted for MRM followed
by the list used for SOAP, if any, is a truncation of the true preference list,
despite the popularity of NRMP as a working example of the stable matching
model. Indeed, this drawback does not depend on how SOAP is administered
but is simply due to the possibility that a candidate r unmatched in MRM
may have lost the chance of being accepted by some hospital h he would list in
SOAP because this hospital h has been filled in MRM by candidates possibly
less preferred by h to r.
The algorithmic question studied in this paper is motivated by an approach
to address the above issues: a multi-round stable matching procedure. This pro-
cedure is designed to produce a stable matching as the final outcome, while
allowing participants to incrementally form their preference lists. In the first
round, each participant submits a truncation of its true preference list, listing
only a small number of candidates it ranks the highest. The deferred-acceptance
(DA) algorithm of Gale and Shapley [1] is applied to these truncated preference
lists and stops prematurely with a partial outcome. In the second and succes-
sive rounds, the lists of the participants are extended, with more agents in the
opposite side added in their tails as needed to continue the execution of the DA
algorithm.
We list potential benefits of such a multi-round procedure.
1. In the first round, the participant can concentrate on the evaluations of those
candidates that are potentially ranked the highest, which makes it easier to
form an accurate list for the first submission.
2. In subsequent rounds, some participants do not need to submit extensions
to their lists, as those extensions are not required by the DA algorithm. The
saving in the evaluation effort for those participants can be huge.
3. Even for a participant who does need to submit an extension, the evaluation
task can be easier since (1) some of the remaining candidates may be ex-
cluded from considerations as it can be deduced (by the central agency) from
the submissions so far that they have no possibility to be matched to the
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participant and (2), except for in the last round, the participant may con-
centrate on those candidate it considers the strongest among the remaining
candidates, similarly to the situation in the first round.
We model the situation after each round in such a multi-round procedure
as follows. The matching is to be made between the set R of residents and
the set H of hospitals. We assume that the true preference lists of both the
residents and hospitals are complete, listing all members on the opposite side,
and strict, allowing no ties. If J is an instance with complete preference lists and
I is obtained from J by truncating some preference lists in J , then we call I a
truncation of J and J a completion of I. We allow truncations on both sides.
When we run the resident-proposing DA algorithm on an instance I exe-
cuting as many steps as possible in the absence of the missing parts of the
preference lists, the execution results in the set of tentative matches for I, which
we denote by tent(I). Here, and throughout the paper, a match means simply
a resident-hospital pair and should not be confused with a matching, which is
a set of matches with certain properties. To deal with the truncations of the
preference lists of hospitals to suit our purposes, we need some adaptation of the
standard DA algorithm: hospital h may reject the proposal of resident r not in
its preference list only when h has filled its quotas by residents which do appear
in its list; the proposal of r to h remains pending otherwise. See Section 2 for a
formal definition of the adapted DA algorithm and tentative matches for trun-
cated instances. If I happens to be complete, then tent(I) is nothing but the
resident-optimal stable matching for I [1]. When I is truncated, each match in
tent(I) is truly tentative and may eventually be rejected when the DA algorithm
continues execution on some completion of I. We are interested in the following
property of tentative matches and the question on this property.
Definition 1. We say that a match in tent(I) is finalizable in I if this match
is in tent(J), the resident-optimal stable matching for J , for every completion
J of I.
FTM (Finalizability of Tentative Matches)
Instance An instance I of the hospitals/residents problem and a match (r, h) ∈
tent(I).
Question Is (r, h) finalizable in I?
For positive integer k, we write k-FTM for the version of FTM where the
instances are restricted to those having quota at most k for every hospital: in
particular, 1-FTM deals with the one-to-one (stable marriage) instances.
In each round of our multi-round procedure, we first compute tent(I) by
the DA algorithm, where I is the instance specified by the submissions up to
that round, and then compute the set of finalizable matches in tent(I). Those
finalizable matches are officially finalized and, in the succesive rounds, residents
in the finalized matches stop participation and the quotas of the hospitals therein
are reduced. In the final round, each remaining participant is asked to submit
the complete preference list on the remaining participants in the opposite side.
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It is clear from the definition of finalizability that the matching formed by the
entire process is identical to the one that would be obtained in one round where
the participants submit the complete true preference lists. It is important to note
here that we do not need to compute the set of finalizable matches exactly: any
subset is sufficient to ensure the correct outcome and a large subset is desirable
for having good progresses through rounds. Thus, even though we have negative
results on the tractability of FTM as described below, they by no means deny
the utility of the notion of finalizability.
Our first result is indeed negative (Theorem 1): FTM, even 1-FTM in fact,
is coNP-complete.
We then look at a special case. When the resident-proposing DA algorithm is
executed on an instance and resident r is tentatively matched to hospital h in the
outcome, the tail part of the preference list of r after h remains “unconsumed” by
the algorithm. We say that an instance I is resident-minimal if this unconsumed
tail is empty for every resident r. Equivalently, I is resident-minimal if the set of
matches (r, h) such that h is on the preference list of r equals the set of matches
that are proposed in the execution of the DA algorithm on I. Resident-minimal
instances are of interest for the following reasons.
1. A natural and purely algorithm-driven matching procedure with incremental
submissions would ask for further submissions of participants only when
extending their preference lists is absolutely necessary for a progress. In a
procedure that applies this policy on residents, the instance we have at each
execution step is resident-minimal.
2. Suppose we use a backtrack algorithm to decide if a match is finalizable
in a general truncated instance I, which executes the DA algorithm and
branches on the next preferred hospital of a resident when it is not given
in I. The extension of I that the algorithm constructs in each branching
path eventually becomes resident-minimal and the backtrack search beyond
this search node can be pruned if an efficient algorithm for resident-minimal
instances is available.
3. Each general truncated instance I has a further truncation I ′ that is resident-
minimal. The finalizability in I ′ is a sufficient condition for the finalizability
in I and therefore an efficient computation for resident minimal instances
would be useful in estimating the set of finalizable matches in the general
case.
Although it is possible to define an analogous notion of hospital-minimal in-
stances, it is not as natural or as useful as that of resident-minimal instances
mainly because the preference lists of hospitals are not “sequentially consumed”
in the resident-proposing algorithm.
We write FTM-RM for FTM (and k-FTM-RM for k-FTM) in which the
instances are restricted to be resident-minimal. Our main result on FTM-RM
is a computationally useful characterization of negative instances of FTM-RM
(Theorem 2). This characterization may be used, for example, to formulate an
integer program or to design a dynamic programming algorithm for FTM-RM.
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We also give a polynomial time algorithm for 1-FTM-RM, the stable marriage
case, based on this characterization (Theorem 4). On the other hand, we show
that 2-FTM-RM, and hence FTM-RM, remains coNP-complete (Theorem 5).
We also develop a polynomial-time decidable sufficient condition for a tenta-
tive match being finalizable (Theorem 6). This sufficient condition may be used
to compute a subset of finalizable matches in the proposed multi-round stable
matching procedures. We also show that this condition is necessary for 1-FTM-
RM (Theorem 7). This gives another proof that 1-FTM-RM is polynomial time
solvable.
Applications As in typical Japanese Universities, every student in the author’s
department is required to take a one-year research project course before gradu-
ation, supervised by one of the faculty members. This situation gives rise to a
typical instance of a many-to-one stable matching problem.
Since 2014, the department has been administering a two-round stable match-
ing procedure. Supervisors first submit a complete rank list of students based
on grade scores and the results of interviews. Then, in the first round of match-
ing, each student lists up to 3 most preferred supervisors in their rank list. The
DA algorithm is executed on this truncated instance and the resulting tentative
matches are tested for finalizability using the sufficient condition described in
Section 5. Only those students without finalized matches proceed to the second
round, where they submit a complete preference list of the supervisors who are
not filled by finalized matches.
This two-round procedure has been working well: a somewhat surprisingly
large number of students are finalized in the first round, resulting in a huge
amount of saving in the evaluation effort and stress on the students’ side. Due
to the lack of publicly disclosable statistics, we perform simulations in Section 6
to reproduce the phenomenon in a transparent manner.
It would be a challenging research topic to study the feasibility of replacing
the current NRMP procedure by a two-round matching procedure in our ap-
proach. The advantage of having a stable matching as a final outcome is attrac-
tive and the success in the smaller scale market described above is encouraging.
The first step of the feasibility study would be to compute the finalizability of
the matches produced by the main matching procedure of NRMP in the past,
interpreting the preference lists used in the procedure as truncations of the true
lists. This task is challenging, because of the intractability of FTM and the size
of the market. We note, however, that we may not necessarily need exact so-
lutions. Reasonably good estimates on the number of finalizable matches may
be sufficient for our evaluation purposes. Theorem 2 (a characterization of neg-
ative instances in the resident-minimal case) and Proposition 8 together with
Theorem 6 (a polynomial time computable sufficient condition for finalizability)
would be indispensable in computing upper and lower bounds on that number.
Related work Truncation of preference lists in the two-sided matching model
have been studied in a different context, namely strategic manipulations. For
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example, Roth and Rothblum [7] study the one-to-one matching case and show
that there are instances where a participant on the proposed side (a hospital in
our model) may expect to benefit significantly by truncating its true preference
list, even in the situation where little information on the preference lists of other
participants is available.
More traditionally, incomplete preference lists arise not as truncations but
as true representations of preferences, where candidates not on the list are sim-
ply meant unacceptable. There has been active research on the complexity of
computing stable matchings for instances allowing incomplete preference lists
and/or ties (see [3] for a survey).
Rastegari et al. [6] and Rastegari et al. [5] address the incompleteness of the
preference orders that are inevitable in large markets in practice. They analyze
matching markets where the participants submit their preferences in the form
of partial orders that are consistent with their true total orders. The authors of
[6] aim at optimizing the number of interviews needed to sufficiently refine the
partial orders while the authors of [5] study the complexity of reasoning about
the stable matchings for the true hidden preference orders using the partial
information available. Our present work may be viewed as dealing with a special
case of their model, where the partial preference order can be represented in
the form of a truncation. Although successively extending preference lists is
restrictive than successive refinements of partial orders, it allows the participants
to concentrate on selecting top preferences first and help reduce the chance of
regrets in the submitted lists, compared to the case where complete lists are
required in one shot. The advantage of being restrictive is that we may have
more computationally positive results: none of the positive results in this paper
seem to extend to the general partial order model.
A result analogous to the coNP-completeness of 1-FTM (Theorem 1) may be
found in their work [5]. Restricting themselves to the stable marriage case, they
consider the problem, among others, of deciding if a given match is a necessary
match, that is, if it is contained in the resident-optimal (employer-optimal, in
their setting) stable matching for every completion of the given partial orders
into total orders. They show that this problem is coNP-complete. Theorem 1 in
our present paper implies that this hardness holds for special instances where the
partial orders are restricted to those representable by truncations. Their result
does not imply our result and, moreover, neither does their proof, since their
reduction uses partial orders that are not representable by truncations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives preliminaries of
this paper. In Section 3 we prove the coNP-completeness of 1-FTM. In Section 4
we study resident-minimal instances. In Section 5, we give the sufficient condition
for finalizability. In Section 6, we describe our simulation results on the student-
supervisor assignment problem. We conclude the paper in Section ??, where we
point to some directions for future work.
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2 Preliminaries
Formally, an instance I of our hospitals/residents problem is a 5-tuple (R,H,
{qh}h∈H , {λr}r∈R, {pih}h∈H), where R is the set of residents, H is the set of
hospitals, qh for each h is the quota of h, λr for each r ∈ R is the preference
list of r on H, and pih for each h ∈ H is the preference list of h on R. The
first three components R, H, and {qh}h∈H will always be denoted by these
symbols and when we speak of various instances in a context, these components
will be common among those instances: only the preference lists will vary. A
preference list on a set S is complete if it lists all members of S. Our instances in
general may have preference lists that are not complete. An instance is resident-
complete (hospital-complete, resp.) if the preference list of each resident (hospital,
resp.) is complete. It is complete if it is both resident- and hospital-complete. A
match is a pair in R ×H: we say match (r, h) involves r and h. For each set of
matches M and h ∈ H, we define resM = {r | (r, h) ∈M for some h ∈ H} and
reshM = {r | (r, h) ∈M}. A set M of matches is a matching in I if M contains
at most one match that involves r, for each r ∈ R, and |reshM | ≤ qh for each
h ∈ H.
We use + operator for concatenation of sequences and for appending or
prepending elements to sequences. A sequence α is a prefix of a sequence β, and
β is an extension of α, if β can be written as α + γ for some possibly empty
sequence γ. The length of sequence α is denoted by |α|. Our sequences will never
have duplicate elements and therefore the length of α is precisely the cardinality
of the set of elements in α.
We say that an instance I is an extension of an instance J , and that J
is a truncation of I, if the preference list of each resident and each hospital
in I is the extension of that in J . An extension I of J is resident-changeless
(hospital-changeless, resp.) if the preference list of each resident (hospital, resp.)
is identical in I and J .
We apply the DA algorithm to a truncated instance I and stop when further
execution is not possible due to the truncations. We represent the intermediate
result of this execution by two sets of matches: tentative matches are those that
have been proposed but not rejected in the algorithm execution; pending matches
are tentative matches that have not been rejected because of the incompleteness
of the preference list of the hospital involved. See below for a more precise
definition.
We formalize the execution of our version of the DA algorithm as event
sequences. Let I be an instance. An event for I is either (r, h)+, the proposal of
a match (r, h), or (r, h)−, the rejection of a match (r, h). Let σ be a sequence
of events for I (or an event sequence for I, for short). We say that (r, h) is
proposed (rejected, resp.) in σ if (r, h)+ ((r, h)−, resp.) appears in σ. We denote
by prop(σ) (rej(σ), resp.) the set of matches that are proposed (rejected, resp.)
in σ. We define tent(σ) = prop(σ)\rej(σ) and call a match in tent(σ) tentative
in σ. In words, a match is tentative in σ if it is proposed but not rejected in σ.
If a tentative match (r, h) in σ is such that r is not in the preference list of h in
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the instance I then it is a pending match in σ with respect to I. We denote by
pendI(σ) the set of pending matches in σ with respect to I.
Remark 1. In the standard DA algorithm which regards a missing resident r in
the preference list of hospital h as unacceptable to h, there is no notion of pending
matches: the proposal of r to h can be immediately rejected. In our version, such
a proposal should be pending, unless h has filled its quota with proposals from
residents in its list, as we intend to continue the algorithm when more residents
are added to the preference list of h. Also note that the set tent(σ) depends
only on the event sequence σ and not on the instance while the set pendI(σ)
depends on the instance.
Let I be an instance and M an arbitrary set of matches. We say that (r, h) ∈
M is ousted from M in I, if the preference list of h contains at least qh residents
from reshM and either r is missing from this list or preceded by qh or more
residents from reshM in this list. In other words, (r, h) is ousted from M in I,
if, no matter how the preference list of h in I is completed, r is not among the
top qh members of M in the completed list. We let oustedI(M) denote the set
of matches ousted from M in I. We say that an event sequence is I-feasible if it
can be shown so by the inductive procedure below.
1. An empty sequence is I-feasible.
2. Suppose an event sequence σ is I-feasible. Then, σ+ (r, h)+ for each (r, h) ∈
R × H is I-feasible if r 6∈ res tent(σ), (r, h) 6∈ prop(σ), h appears in the
preference list of r ∈ I, and (r, h′) ∈ rej(σ) for every h′ ∈ H that precedes
h in the preference list of r in I. On the other hand, σ + (r, h)− for each
(r, h) ∈ R×H is I-feasible if (r, h) is in oustedI(prop(σ)) \ rej(σ).
Remark 2. We have ousted(prop(σ))\rej(σ) = ousted(tent(σ)) for I-feasible
σ. Therefore, the condition for the I-feasibility of σ + (r, h)− above may be ex-
pressed as (r, h) ∈ ousted(tent(σ)), which is more consistent with the tradi-
tional definition of the DA algorithm. We use the condition in the present form,
since it makes the monotonicity of the feasibility expressed by the following
proposition obvious.
For brevity, we refer to I-feasible event sequences simply as I-feasible se-
quences.
Proposition 1. Let I be an instance and let σ + e be an I-feasible sequence
where e is a single event. Then, for each I-feasible sequence σ′ that contains all
events in σ but not e, σ′ + e is I-feasible.
Given instance I, the execution of the DA algorithm on I results in an ar-
bitrary, due to the non-determinacy of the algorithm, but maximal I-feasible
sequence. The following observation that is well known for the standard DA
algorithm [1] holds also for our variant.
Proposition 2. Let I be an instance and let σ and σ′ be two maximal I-feasible
sequences. Then, σ and σ′ contain the same set of events.
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Proof. Suppose σ′ contains an event that is not in σ. Among such events, choose
one that appears first in σ′ and call it e. Then σ followed by e is I-feasible, due
to Proposition 1, contradicting the maximality of σ. Therefore, σ′ does not have
any event not in σ and vice versa. uunionsq
For an instance I with a maximal I-feasible sequence σ, we denote prop(σ),
rej(σ), tent(σ), and pendI(σ) by prop(I), rej(I), tent(I), and pend(I). This
notation is justified since these sets do not depend on the choice of σ and de-
termined solely by I, by Proposition 2. We say that instance I proposes (rejects,
resp.) a match if it is in prop(I) (rej(I), resp.).
We say that an event sequence is feasible if it is I-feasible for some instance
I.
3 Hardness of 1-FTM
To prove hardness results we use the following folklore. A similar statement
appears in the description of SATISFIABILITY problem in Garey and Johnson
[2]. We include a proof for self-containedness.
Proposition 3. SAT is NP-complete, even when restricted to a clause set in
which each variable appears exactly twice positively and exactly once negatively.
Proof. Let a clause set S be given. We show below that S can be converted
into a clause set S′, without changing the satisfiability, in which each variable
appears exactly three times and moreover at least once positively and at least
once negatively. By replacing some variables by their negations if necessary,
S′ may further be converted into a clause set satisfying the condition of the
proposition.
Suppose variable x occurs k times in S. We may assume k ≥ 2 since otherwise
the value of x can be fixed without changing the satisfiability. Then, we replace
occurrences of x by distinct new variables xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and add clauses x¯i∨xi+1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where xk+1 = x1, to force these variables to take the same value.
The clause set S′ is obtained from S by doing this for all variables. uunionsq
Theorem 1. 1-FTM, and hence FTM, is coNP-complete.
Proof. That FTM is in coNP is trivial. We prove the hardness by reducing SAT
to the complement of 1-FTM.
Let S be an arbitrary set of SAT clauses. Let X be the set of variables of S,
and C1, . . . , Cm the enumeration of clauses in S. Relying on Proposition 3, we
assume that each variable occurs positively in exactly two clauses and negatively
in exactly one clause.
We construct an instance I = (R,H, {qh}h∈H , {pih}h∈H , {λr}r∈R) as follows.
R consists of two distinguished residents r0 and r1, together with distinct resi-
dents r1x, r
2
x, p
0
x, p
1
x, and p
2
x for each x ∈ X. Fix x ∈ X. Let Cj0 , Cj1 , and Cj2
be the three clauses in which x appears and assume that the occurrence of x
in Cj0 is negative. We say that resident p
i
x, i = 0, 1, 2, is associated with the
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occurrence of x in Cji . H consists of a distinguished hospital h0 together with
distinct hospitals h−1x , h
−2
x , h
1
x, and h
2
x for each x ∈ X and distinct hospitals
hj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The preference lists of the hospitals are as follows. The
unspecified parts of the lists are immaterial.
1. The list of h0 starts with r0 followed by r1.
2. For x ∈ X and i = 1, 2, the list of h−ix starts with rix followed by p0x.
3. For x ∈ X and i = 1, 2, the list of hix starts with rix followed by pix.
4. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the list of hj starts with the residents (of the form p0x, p1x,
or p2x for some x) that are associated with the variable occurrences in Cj , in
an arbitrary order, followed by r0.
The preference lists of the residents are as follows. Unlike in the description
above for hospitals, these lists are truncated after the specified elements.
1. The list of r0 is h1, h2, . . .hm, followed by h0.
2. The list of r1 consists solely of h0.
3. For each x ∈ X, the lists of r1x and r2x are empty.
4. For each x ∈ x, the list of p0x starts with h−1x and h−2x in this order, followed
by hj , where Cj is the clause that contains the variable occurrence with
which resident p0x is associated.
5. For each x ∈ x and i = 1, 2, the list of pix starts with hix followed by hj , where
Cj is the clause that contains the variable occurrence with which resident
pix is associated.
See Figure 1 for an example.
First observe that tent(I) = {(r1, h0), (r0, h1)}∪{(p0x, h−1x ), (p1x, h1x), (p2x, h2x) |
x ∈ X}. We show that (r1, h0) is not finalizable in I if and only if S is satisfiable.
Let J be an extension of I. We say that resident p of the form pix is activated
in J , if match (p, hj) is proposed in J , where hj is such that Cj contains the
variable occurrence to which p is associated and hence hj is the last entry of the
preference list of p in I. Observe that, p0x is activated if and only if r
1
x chooses h
−1
x
and r2x chooses h
−2
x as their first hospitals on their lists. Similarly, p
i
x, i = 1, 2, is
activated if and only if rix chooses h
i
x. Therefore, for each x ∈ X, the two events
(1) p0x is activated and (2) both p
1
x and p
2
x are activated are mutually exclusive
and, moreover, we may choose the way the lists of r1x and r
2
x are extended so
that at least one of (1) and (2) happens. Thus, the activation of residents p0x,
p1x, and p
2
x can properly simulate the truth assignment to variable x.
Also observe that (r1, h0) is rejected if and only if (r0, h0) is proposed, which
happens if and only if there is a chain of rejections/proposals of resident r0
through the hospitals h1, . . . , hm leading to this proposal. Since the pair (r0, hj)
is rejected, provided that this pair is proposed, if and only if at least one resident
on the list of hj that is associated with a variable occurrence in Cj is activated,
we conclude that S is satisfiable if and only if there is an extension of I in which
(r1, h0) is rejected. uunionsq
4 Resident-minimal instances
In this section, we study resident-minimal instances.
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(a) Clause set S
(b) The instance of 1-FTM corresponding to S
Tentative matches are shown in bold face from both sides
Fig. 1. Reduction from SAT to the complement of 1-FTM
4.1 Simple extensions and prescriptions
In this subsection, we define the notions of simple extensions and prescriptions,
which characterize negative instances of FTM-RM. Hospital-complete instances
play an important role here.
Proposition 4. Let I be a resident-minimal instance and J a resident-changeless
and hospital-complete extension of I. Then J is also resident-minimal. We also
have prop(I) = prop(J) and tent(I) \ pend(I) ⊆ tent(J) ⊆ tent(I).
Proof. Let L be the set of all matches (r, h) such that h is on the prefer-
ence list of r in I. Since I is resident-minimal, we have prop(I) = L. As
prop(I) ⊆ prop(J) ⊆ L, we have prop(I) = prop(J) and J is resident-
minimal. It immediately follows that tent(J) ⊆ tent(I). Let (r, h) be a match
in tent(I) \ pend(I). Then, r is on the preference list of h in I and hence ex-
tending the preference list of h does not affect the rank of r. Therefore, we have
(r, h) ∈ tent(J) and hence tent(I) \ pend(I) ⊆ tent(J). uunionsq
Let σ be an event sequence. We say that an extension σ + τ of σ is simple
if prop(τ) ∩ rej(τ) = ∅ or, in words, τ never rejects a proposal made in itself.
We say that an extension J of instance I is simple if the maximal I-feasible
sequence has a simple maximal J-feasible extension or, equivalently, (prop(J) \
prop(I))∩ (rej(J) \ rej(I)) = ∅. The goal of this subsection is to show that, for
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each resident-minimal instance I, we do not need to search through all extensions
of a maximal I-feasible sequence to decide the finalizability of a match in tent(I):
we need only to look at simple extensions. Indeed, it will turn out that we need
only to look at hospital-complete simple extensions.
Proposition 5. Let I be a resident-minimal instance and J a simple extension
of I. Then, there is a simple and hospital-complete extension J ′ of I such that
rej(J) ⊆ rej(J ′).
Proof. Let I and J be as in the lemma. We assume without loss of generality
that J is resident-minimal: if not, take an appropriate truncation. Let J1 be
an arbitrary hospital-complete and resident-changeless extension of J . Since J
is resident-minimal, so is J1 by Proposition 4. We also have rej(J) ⊆ rej(J1)
and, moreover, (rej(J1) \ rej(J)) ⊆ pend(J), since J1 is a resident-changeless
extension of J . We construct a simple extension of I by truncating preference
lists of residents in J1. Let M = (rej(J1) \ rej(J)) \ tent(I). For each (r, h) ∈
M , h is the last entry of the preference list of r in J and hence in J1, since
(r, h) ∈ pend(J) and J is resident-minimal. Let J ′ be obtained from J1 by, for
each match (r, h) ∈M , removing h from the preference list of r. Then, we have
prop(J ′) = prop(J1) \ M and rej(J ′) = rej(J1) \ M . For each (r, h) ∈ M ,
h is not on the preference list of r in I, since (r, h) 6∈ (tent(I) ∪ rej(J)) ⊇
(tent(I) ∪ rej(I)) = prop(I). Therefore, J ′ is an extension of I. We claim that
it is a simple extension of I. To see this, observe that rej(J ′) \ rej(J) ⊆ tent(I)
from the construction of J ′. Since no match in (prop(J ′)\prop(I)) ⊆ (prop(J)\
prop(I)) can be in rej(J) as J is a simple extension of I, no such match can be
in rej(J ′). Therefore, J ′ is a simple extension of I. As M ⊆ (rej(J1) \ rej(J))
and rej(J ′) = rej(J1) \M , we have rej(J) ⊆ rej(J ′) and are done. uunionsq
For the time being, we concentrate on resident-minimal instances that are
also hospital-complete and try to characterize their simple extensions.
Proposition 6. Let I be a resident-minimal and hospital-complete instance and
J a simple extension of I. Let P = prop(J) \prop(I) and X = rej(J) \ rej(I).
Then, these sets of matches satisfy the following conditions.
P1: P ∩ prop(I) = ∅.
P2: For each r ∈ R, there is at most one h ∈ H such that (r, h) ∈ P .
P3: X ⊆ tent(I).
P4: resP ∩ res tent(I) ⊆ resX.
P5: For each h ∈ H, we have |resh(P ∪ (tent(I) \ X)))| ≤ qh. Moreover, if
reshX is non-empty then we have |resh(P ∪ (tent(I) \X)))| = qh.
P6: For each h ∈ H, each member of resh(P ∪ (tent(I) \ X))) precedes all
members of reshX in the preference list of h in I.
uunionsq
A prescription for resident-minimal and hospital complete instance I is a
pair (P,X) of sets of matches that satisfies the conditions P1 through P6 in
Proposition 6. The target set of prescription (P,X), denoted by tgs(P,X) is
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defined by tgs(P,X) = {(r, h) ∈ X | r 6∈ resP}. The crucial part of the proof
of the result in this section is in showing that a certain form of converse of
Proposition 6 holds: a prescription (P,X) for I implies a simple extension of I
that rejects matches in tgs(P,X).
Proposition 7. Let I be a resident-minimal and hospital-complete instance and
let (P,X) be a prescription for I. Then, we have |resP\res tent(I)| ≥ |tgs(P,X)|.
Proof. Let Q = {(r, h) ∈ P | r 6∈ res tent(I)}. By condition P2 for (P,X) being
a prescription for I, we have |Q| = |resP \ res tent(I)|. Our goal is to show
that |Q| ≥ |tgs(P,X)|.
By condition P5 for (P,X) being a prescription for I, we have |reshX| ≤
|resh P | for each h ∈ H. Therefore, we have |X| ≤ |P |. On the other hand, let
(r, h) be a match in (r, h) ∈ P \ Q. Because of condition P4, there is some h′
such that (r, h′) ∈ X. However, by definition, (r, h′) 6∈ tgs(P,X) as r ∈ resP .
Therefore, we have |P \Q| ≤ |X\tgs(P,X)|. As Q is a subset of P and tgs(P,X)
is a subset of X, we have |P | − |Q| ≤ |X| − |tgs(P,X)|. Combining this with
|X| ≤ |P |, we conclude that |Q| ≥ |tgs(P,X)|. uunionsq
Lemma 1. Let I be a resident-minimal and hospital-complete instance and sup-
pose there is a prescription (P,X) for I. Then there is some simple extension J of
I such that prop(J)\prop(I) ⊆ P , rej(J)\rej(I) ⊆ X, and tgs(P,X) ⊆ rej(J).
Proof. Let I and (P,X) be as in the lemma and σ a maximal I-feasible sequence.
We prove the statement of the lemma by induction on |P |. We take tgs(P,X) =
∅ as the base case, which includes the case P = X = ∅. The statement is satisfied
with J = I in this case.
For the induction step, suppose tgs(P,X) is non-empty and let Q = {(r, h) ∈
P | r 6∈ res tent(I)}. Since tgs(P,X) is non-empty, Q is non-empty by Propo-
sition 7. Let σ + τ1 be an extension of σ such that τ1 first lists the proposals
of matches in Q in an arbitrary order and then lists all rejections, in an arbi-
trary order, that are made possible by these proposals (without further chain
of proposals and rejections). Then, σ + τ1 is maximal I1-feasible where I1 is
the extension of I obtained by appending h in the preference list of r for each
(r, h) ∈ Q. We claim that rej(τ1) ⊆ X. To see this, fix h ∈ H. By condition P5
for (P,X) being a prescription for I, we have |resh(P ∪ (tent(I) \ X)))| ≤ qh
and hence |resh(Q∪ (tent(I) \X)| ≤ qh. Thus, no match (r, h) is rejected by τ1
unless (r, h) ∈ X. If tgs(P,X) ⊆ rej(I1) then we are done with J = I1.
So suppose otherwise, that tgs(P,X) is not contained in rej(I1). Consider
the prescription (P1, X1) for I1 where P1 = P \ Q and X1 = X \ rej(τ1). We
confirm that this pair is indeed a prescription for I1. From condition P1 for
(P,X) being a prescription for I, we have P ∩ prop(I) = ∅. Since prop(I1) =
prop(I)∪Q and P1 = P \Q, it follows that P1∩prop(I1) = ∅, condition P1 for
(P1, X1) being a prescription for I1. Condition P2 immediately follows from the
corresponding condition for (P,X). Since X ⊆ tent(I) (condition P3 for (P,X))
and X1 = X \ rej(τ1), we have X1 ⊆ tent(I) \ rej(τ1) ⊆ tent(I1), condition P3.
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For condition P4, we use the facts that P1 and Q partition P and that Q
and tent(I)\rej(τ1) partition tent(I1). Also using condition P4 for (P,X) that
resP ∩ res tent(I) ⊆ X, we have
resP1 ∩ res tent(I1) = (resP \ resQ) ∩ res(Q ∪ (tent(I) \ rej(τ1)))
= (resP \ resQ) ∩ (resQ ∪ (res tent(I) \ res rej(τ1)))
= resP ∩ (res tent(I) \ res rej(τ1))
= (resP ∩ res tent(I)) \ res rej(τ1)
⊆ resX \ res rej(τ1)
⊆ res(X \ rej(τ1))
= resX1.
Therefore, condition P4 holds.
For conditions P5 and P6, observe that
P1 ∪ (tent(I1) \X1) = P1 ∪ ((Q ∪ (tent(I) \ rej(τ1))) \X1))
= P1 ∪ (((Q ∪ tent(I)) \ rej(τ1))) \X1))
= P1 ∪ (Q ∪ (tent(I) \X))
= P ∪ (tent(I) \X),
where we have repeatedly used the disjointness between subsets of P and subsets
of X. Therefore, for each h ∈ H, we have res(P1 ∪ (tent(I1) \X1)) = res(P ∪
(tent(I) \X)) and hence condition P5 for (P1, X1) follows from that for (P,X).
Moreover, by condition P6 for (P,X), each member of resh(P ∪ (tent(I) \X))
precedes all members of X in the preference list of h in I. Since X1 ⊆ X and I1
is an extension of I, it follows that each member of resh(P1 ∪ (tent(I1) \X1))
precedes all members of X1 in the preference list of h in I1: condition P6 holds.
We have confirmed that (P1, X1) is indeed a prescription for I1.
We note that tgs(P1, X1) = tgs(P,X) \ rej(τ1) is non-empty under our cur-
rent assumption. Therefore, we may apply the induction hypothesis to instance
I1 and prescription (P1, X1) for I1 to obtain a simple and hospital-complete ex-
tension I ′1 of I1 such that prop(I
′
1) \prop(I1) ⊆ P1, rej(I ′1) \ rej(I1) ⊆ X1, and
tgs(P1, X1) ⊆ rej(I ′1). We have
prop(I ′1) \ prop(I) = (prop(I ′1) \ prop(I1)) ∪ (prop(I1) \ prop(I))
⊆ P1 ∪Q
= P,
rej(I ′1) \ rej(I) ⊆ (rej(I ′1) \ rej(I1)) ∪ (rej(I1) \ rej(I))
⊆ X1 ∪ rej(τ1)
= X,
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and
tgs(P,X) ⊆ tgs(P1, X1) ∪ rej(τ1)
⊆ rej(I ′1) ∪ rej(τ1)
= rej(I ′1),
since rej(τ1) ⊆ rej(I1) ⊆ rej(I ′1). Therefore, setting J = I ′1, the statement of
the lemma holds. This completes the induction step and hence the proof of the
lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 2. Let I be a resident-minimal and hospital-complete instance and (r0, h0)
a match in tent(I) that is not finalizable in I. Let σ be a maximal I-feasible se-
quence and σ + τ a shortest feasible extension of σ that rejects (r0, h0). Then,
(prop(τ), rej(τ)) is a prescription for I with tgs(prop(τ), rej(τ)) = {(r0, h0)}.
Proof. We set P = prop(τ) \ rej(τ) and X = rej(τ) \ prop(τ). It will turn out
that prop(τ) ∩ rej(τ) = ∅ and hence P = prop(τ) and X = rej(τ).
We first confirm that (P,X) is a prescription for I. Since σ + τ is feasible,
P ⊆ prop(τ) is disjoint from prop(σ) = prop(I): condition P1 holds. Since
P ⊆ tent(σ + τ), for each r ∈ R, there is at most one h such that (r, h) ∈ P :
condition P2 holds. Since each match rejected by τ but not already in tent(σ)
must be in prop(τ), we have X ⊆ tent(I): condition P3 holds. For condition P4,
let r ∈ resP ∩ res tent(I). As (r, h) for some h is proposed in τ , some match
(r, h′) ∈ tent(I) must be rejected in τ and hence in rej(τ) \ prop(τ) = X.
Therefore, we have resP ∩ res tent(I) ⊆ resX.
For conditions P5 and P6, fix h ∈ H. Since P ∪ (tent(I) \X) = tent(σ+ τ),
we have |resh(P ∪ (tent(I) \X))| ≤ qh. Moreover, if reshX is non-empty, then
τ rejects a match involving h and therefore this inequality is tight. Therefore,
condition P5 holds. As each member of resh(tent(σ+ τ)) precedes all members
of resh(rej(τ)), condition P6 holds.
We have (r0, h0) ∈ rej(τ) and, from the assumption that τ is chosen to be the
shortest, r0 is not involved in any proposal in τ . Therefore (r0, h0) ∈ tgs(P,X).
A match (r, h) in tgs(P,X) distinct from (r0, h0) would also contradict that
assumption, since the rejection of such (r, h) may be removed from τ without
affecting the feasibility as r is not involved in any proposal in τ . We conclude
that tgs(P,X) = {(r0, h0)}.
By Lemma 1, there is a simple extension J of I such that prop(J)\prop(I) ⊆
P , rej(J) \ rej(I) ⊆ X, and (r0, h0) ⊆ rej(J). Let σ + τ ′ be a maximum J-
feasible extension of σ. Then, prop(τ ′) = prop(J) \ prop(I) ⊆ P ⊆ prop(τ)
and rej(τ ′) = rej(J) \ rej(I) ⊆ X ⊆ rej(τ). All of these inclusions must in fact
be equalities, since otherwise σ+ τ ′ is a feasible extension of σ rejecting (r0, h0)
that is shorter than σ + τ , a contradiction. Therefore, we have prop(τ ′) =
prop(τ) = P and rej(τ ′) = rej(τ) = X, finishing the proof of the lemma. uunionsq
We have focused on those resident-minimal instances that are also hospital-
complete. The following theorem, however, is on general resident-minimal in-
stances.
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Theorem 2. . Let I be a resident-minimal instance and (r0, h0) a match in
tent(I). Then, the following three conditions are equivalent.
(1) Match (r0, h0) is not finalizable in I.
(2) There is a resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension I ′ of I such
that there is a prescription (P, Y ) for I ′ with (r0, h0) ∈ tgs(P, Y ).
(3) There is a simple extension of I that rejects (r0, h0).
Proof. (3) ⇒ (1) is trivial. We show (1) ⇒ (2) ⇒ (3) below.
(1) ⇒ (2): Suppose (r0, h0) is not finalizable in I. Let J be an extension of I
that rejects (r0, h0). Let J
′ be an arbitrary resident-changeless and hospital-
complete extension of J . We let I ′ be the resident-changeless and hospital-
complete extension of I in which the preference list of each hospital is identical
to that in J ′. By Proposition 4, I ′ is resident-minimal. Since J ′ is an extension
of I ′ and rejects (r0, h0), by Lemma 2, there is a prescription (P, Y ) for I ′ such
that (r0, h0) ∈ tgs(P, Y ).
(2) ⇒ (3): Let I ′ and (P, Y ) be as in condition (2). By Lemma 1, there is
a simple extension J of I ′ such that tgs(P, Y ) ⊆ rej(J). Since J is a simple
extension of I, we are done. uunionsq
This theorem shows that, for resident-minimal instance I, a triple (P, Y, I ′),
where I ′ is a resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension of I and (P, Y )
is a prescription for I ′, is a certificate that each match in tgs(P, Y ) is not fi-
nalizable in I. We seek a more concise certificate and generalize the notion of
prescription to general resident-minimal instances.
Let I be a resident-minimal instance. A prescription for I is a pair (P,X)
of sets of matches that satisfies conditions P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 in Proposition 6
together with the following condition that replaces P6.
P6’: For each h ∈ H, the following holds. Each member of resh(P ∪ ((tent(I) \
pend(I)) \ X))) precedes all members of resh(X \ pend(I)) in the pref-
erence list of h in I. Moreover, if resh(X \ pend(I)) is non-empty then
resh pend(I) ⊆ reshX.
The target set tgs(P,X) of prescription (P,X) is defined in the same manner
as in the special case before: tgs(P,X) = {(r, h) ∈ X | r 6∈ resP}.
Note that if I is hospital-complete then pend(I) is empty and hence condi-
tion P6’ is equivalent to condition P6.
Lemma 3. Let I be a resident-minimal instance, I ′ a resident-changeless and
hospital-complete extension of I, and (P, Y ) a prescription for I ′. Then, (P,X),
where X = Y ∪ (rej(I ′) \ rej(I)) is a prescription for I.
Proof. Conditions P1 and P2 do not depend onX and therefore follow from those
conditions for prescription (P, Y ). Since Y ⊆ tent(I ′) ⊆ tent(I) and rej(I ′) \
rej(I) ⊆ tent(I), condition P3 that X ⊆ tent(I) holds. For condition P4, let
r ∈ resP ∩ res tent(I). If r ∈ resP ∩ res tent(I ′) then r ∈ Y by condition P4
for prescription (P, Y ). Otherwise, r ∈ res(rej(I ′) \ rej(I)) ⊆ resX. Therefore,
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condition P4 holds. Condition P5 is equivalent to condition P5 for prescription
(P, Y ), since P∪(tent(I)\X) = P∪(tent(I ′)\Y ). For condition P6, fix h ∈ H. In
the preference list of h in I ′, each member of resh(P ∪ (tent(I) \X)) precedes
all members of resh Y by condition P6 for prescription (P, Y ), and obviously
precedes all members of resh(rej(I
′)\rej(I)). Therefore, it precedes all members
of reshX. If r 6∈ res pend(I) then r is already in the preference list of h in I.
Therefore, each member of resh(P ∪ ((tent(I) \ pend(I)) \ X))) precedes all
members of resh(X \pend(I)) in the preference list of h in I. Moreover, suppose
some r ∈ resh(X \ pend(I)) and some r′ ∈ resh (pend(I) \X). Then, since r′
is in resh(P ∪ (tent(I)\X)) and r ∈ resh Y , r′ must precede r in the preference
list of h in I ′. But this is impossible since r is on the preference list of h in I
while r′ is not, a contradiction. Therefore, if resh(X \ pend(I)) is non-empty
then resh pend(I) ⊆ reshX: condition P6 holds. uunionsq
Lemma 4. Let I be a resident-minimal instance and (P,X) is a prescription
for I. Then, there is some resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension
I ′ of I such that (P, Y ), where Y = X \ rej(I ′), is a prescription for I ′.
Proof. For each h ∈ H, arbitrarily complete the preference list of h in I so
that the residents in resh(pend(I) ∩X) get the lowest ranks in the completed
list. Let the resulting instance be I ′. We confirm that (P, Y ) is a prescription
for I ′. Conditions P1 and P2 do not depend on P and therefore follow from
those conditions for prescription (P,X). Since X ⊆ tent(I) and tent(I ′) =
tent(I)\rej(I ′), condition P3 that Y ⊆ tent(I ′) holds. For condition P4, let r ∈
resP ∩ res tent(I ′). Since r ∈ resP ∩ tent(I), we have r ∈ resX by condition
P4 for prescription (P,X). Therefore, we have r ∈ resX∩res tent(I ′) = res(X\
rej(I ′)) = resY , condition P4. Condition P5 is equivalent to condition P5 for
prescription (P,X), since P ∪ (tent(I) \X) = P ∪ (tent(I ′) \ Y ).
To show that P6 holds, let r ∈ resh(P∪(tent(I ′)\Y ))) = resh(P∪(tent(I)\
X)). Suppose first that r 6∈ resh pend(I). Then, by condition P6’ for (P,X), r
precedes all members of resh(Y \ pend(I)) ⊆ resh(X \ pend(I)) in the pref-
erence list of h in I and hence in I ′ as well. Since r precedes all members of
resh pend(I) in the preference list of h in I
′ by the way I ′ completes the pref-
erence list of h, we conclude that r precedes all members of reshX in that
preference list. Suppose next that r ∈ resh pend(I). Then, since resh pend(I),
having r as a member, is not contained in reshX, resh(X \pend(I)) is empty,
by condition P6’ for (P,X). Therefore r precedes all members in reshX in the
preference list of h in I ′, as those members are placed in the lowest positions. In
either case, r precedes all members of resh Y ⊆ reshX in the preference list of
h in I ′, that is, condition P6 holds for (P, Y ). uunionsq
Thus, a prescription for a general resident-minimal instance is indeed a cer-
tificate for the negative answer to the finalizability of a tentative match.
Theorem 3. Let I be a resident-minimal instance and (r0, h0) a match in tent(I)\
pend(I). Then, there is a prescription (P,X) for I with (r0, h0) ∈ tgs(P,X) if
and only if there is some resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension I ′
of I and a prescription (P, Y ) for I ′ with (r0, h0) ∈ (P, Y ).
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Proof. Suppose first that there is a prescription (P,X) for I with (r0, h0) ∈
tgs(P,X). By Lemma 4, there is a resident-changeless and hospital-complete
extension I ′ of I and a prescription (P, Y ) for I ′ such that Y = X \ rej(I ′).
As X ∩ rej(I ′) ⊆ pend(I) and (r0, h0) 6∈ pend(I), (r0, h0) ∈ tgs(P,X) implies
(r0, h0) ∈ tgs(P, Y ). For the converse, suppose that there is a resident-changeless
and hospital-complete extension I ′ of I and a prescription (P, Y ) for I with
(r0, h0) ∈ tgs(P, Y ). By Lemma 3, (P,X), where X = Y ∪ (rej(I ′) \ rej(I)), is
a prescription for I. Since tgs(P, Y ) ⊆ tgs(P,X), we have (r0, h0) ∈ tgs(P,X).
uunionsq
We close this subsection by sketching an integer program (IP) for computing
a prescription for a given resident-minimal instance I and a match (r0, h0) ∈
tent(I). More precisely, the IP captures a triple (P,X,Z), where (P,X) is a
prescription for I with (r0, h0) ∈ tgs(P,X) and Z is a subset of pend(I) such
that there is a resident-changeless and hospital complete extension J of I with
Z = rej(J) \ rej(I) and (P,X \ Z) being a prescription for J .
We only describe the variables in the IP and their intended interpretations.
The linear constraints are straightforward to write down based on those in-
terpretations. All the variables are binary. For each match (r, h) 6∈ prop(I),
we have a variable pr,h: pr,h = 1 if and only if (r, h) ∈ P . For each match
(r, h) ∈ tent(I), we have a variable xr,h: xr,h = 1 if and only if (r, h) ∈ X. For
each h ∈ H and a subset S of resh pend(I), we have a variable zh,S : zh,S = 1
if and only if resh Z = S. The objective function is the sum of pr,h over all
(r, h) ∈ (R×H) \ prop(I), which is minimized. The optimal solution of this IP
corresponds to a desired prescription with the smallest cardinality of P .
4.2 Polynomial time algorithm for the stable marriage case
In this subsection, we show that 1-FTM-RM, the finalizability of a tentative
match for resident-minimal stable marriage instances, is polynomial time solv-
able.
Let I be a resident-minimal stable marriage instance. We define a bipartite
digraph GI on vertex sets T = tent(I) and P = (R ×H) \ prop(I) as follows.
Let (r, h) ∈ T and (r′, h′) ∈ P . There is an edge from (r, h) to (r′, h′) if and only
if r = r′. There is an edge from (r′, h′) to (r, h) if and only if h = h′, both r and
r′ are on the preference list of h in I, and r′ precedes r in that list.
Lemma 5. Let I be a resident-minimal stable marriage instance and (r0, h0)
a match in tent(I). Then, there is a simple extension of I that rejects (r0, h0)
if and only if there is a directed path in GI from some root (a vertex without
incoming edges) of GI to (r0, h0).
Proof. Suppose first that I has a simple extension I ′ that rejects (r0, h0). Let
σ be a maximal I-feasible sequence and σ + τ a maximal I ′-feasible sequence.
We determine a sequence of matches (ri, hi), i = 0, 1, . . ., so that the reversed
sequence (rj , hj), j = i, i−1, . . . , 0, forms a directed path from (ri, hi) to (r0, h0)
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in I, for each i. We maintain the invariant that if (ri, hi) ∈ T then (ri, hi) ∈
rej(τ) and if (ri, hi) ∈ P then (ri, hi) ∈ prop(τ). We sart with the given match
(r0, h0).
Suppose i ≥ 0 and match (ri, hi) has been determined. If (ri, hi) is a root
of GI then we are done as we have a desired path from (ri, hi) to (r0, h0).
Suppose otherwise. First suppose that (ri, hi) ∈ T . If (ri, hi) ∈ pend(I) then
ri is not on the preference list of hi in I and hence there is no incoming edge
to (ri, hi) in GI . Since we are assuming that (ri, hi) is not a root of GI , we
conclude that (ri, hi) ∈ tent(I) \ pend(I). Due to the invariant, (ri, hi) is in
rej(τ) and hence its rejection must be preceded in τ by a proposal of some match
(r, hi) in prop(τ) ⊆ P such that r precedes ri in the preference list of hi and
hence there is an edge of Gi from (r, hi) to (ri, hi). We let (ri+1, hi+1) = (r, hi).
Next suppose (ri, hi) ∈ P . Then, by the invariant we have (ri, hi) ∈ prop(τ).
If ri 6∈ res tent(I) then (ri, hi) is a root of GI and we are done. Otherwise, the
proposal of (ri, hi) must be preceded in τ by the rejection of (ri, h) for some h.
We let (ri+1, hi+1) = (ri, h).
As the construction selects matches appearing in τ in the reversed order, it
must eventually end at a root of GI .
For the converse, suppose there is a directed path p from some root of GI to
(r0, h0). Let τp be an event sequence listing the matches in p in the same order
and making each match in P a proposal and each match in T a rejection. Extend
I by adding h to the preference list of r, for each (r, h) ∈ prop(τp). Furthermore,
if the starting vertex (r∗, h∗) of p is in T , which implies that (r∗, h∗) ∈ pend(I),
complete the preference list of h∗ so that r∗ gets the lowest rank. Let I ′ be the
resulting extension of I. Let σ be a maximal I-feasible sequence. If (r∗, h∗) ∈ T
then, as the quota of each hospital is one, σ+ (r∗, h∗)− is I ′-feasible. Otherwise,
since (r∗, h∗) ∈ P and r∗ 6∈ res tent(I), it follows that σ + (r∗, h∗)+ is I ′-
feasible. By a straightforward induction, we may verify that σ+ τp is I
′-feasible.
As rej(τp) ⊆ tent(I), σ + τp is a simple extension of σ and hence I ′ is a simple
extension of I that rejects (r0, h0). uunionsq
The following theorem is immediate from Theorem 2 and Lemma 5.
Theorem 4. 1-FTM-RM is solvable in polynomial time.
4.3 Hardness of FTM-RM
In this subsection, we show that 2-FTM-RM, and hence FTM-RM, is coNP-
complete. The reduction is from SAT through an intermediate problem we call
DIGRAPH-FIRING.
Let G be a digraph and θ : V (G)→ N be a threshold function which assigns
a non-negative integer θ(v) to each vertex v of G. A θ-firing of G is a subgraph
F of G such that, for each v ∈ V (F ), the in-degree of v in F is at least θ(v) and
the out-degree of v in F is at most 1.
k-DIGRAPH-FIRING
Instance: A triple (G, t, θ), where G is a digraph, t is a vertex of G, and θ is a
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threshold function on V (G) such that θ(v) ≤ k for every v ∈ V (G).
Question: Does G have a θ-firing that contains t?
Lemma 6. 2-DAG-FIRING is NP-Complete.
Proof. That 2-DAG-FIRING is in NP is trivial. We show its NP-hardness by a
reduction from SAT. Let S be a set of clauses, X the set of variables of S, and
C1, . . . , Cm the enumeration of clauses in S. Using Proposition 3, we assume
that each variable in X appears positively in exactly two clauses and negatively
in exactly one clause. For each x ∈ X, let i−x denote the index of the clause
containing x negatively and let i1x and i
2
x denote the indices of clauses that
contain x positively. We construct a DAG G as follows. V (G) contains distinct
vertices ai and bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and five distinct vertices ux, vx, l−x , l1x, and l2x
for each x ∈ X. The edge set is defined by
E(G) = {(ai, bi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪ {(bi, bi+1) | 1 ≤ i < m} ∪
⋃
x∈X
Ex,
where
Ex = {(ux, l−x ), (vx, l−x ), (ux, l1x), (vx, l2x), (l−x , ai−x ), (l1x, ai1x), (l2x, ai2x)}.
We set t = bm. The threshold function θ is such that θ(v) is the in-degree of
v except that θ(ai) = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since the only vertices with indegree
possibly larger than two are ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have θ(v) ≤ 2 for every v ∈ V (G).
See Fig. 2 for an example.
(a) Clause set S
(b) DAGG; threshold is equal to the in-degree unless explicitly specified on the shoulder
Fig. 2. Reduction from SAT to 2-DAG-FIRING
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Observe that, for each x ∈ X, a θ-firing cannot contain either l1x or l2x if it
contains l−x but can contain both l
1
x and l
2
x simultaneously if it does not contain
l−x . Given this property of the “variable gadgets” in G, it is straightforward to
see that there is a mutual conversion between a satisfying assignments of S and
a θ-firing of G containing t. uunionsq
Theorem 5. 2-FTM-RM is coNP-complete.
Proof. That 2-FTM-RM is in coNP is trivial. To show that it is coNP-hard, we
we give a polynomial time reduction from k-DAG-FIRING to the complement
of k-FTM-RM, for each positive integer k. As 2-DAG-FIRING is NP-complete
by Lemma 6, the theorem follows.
Fix k. Let (G, t, θ) be an instance of k-DAG-FIRING. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that t is a sink of G. For each v ∈ G, let N−(v) denote the set
of in-neighbors of v in G and let V0 = {v ∈ V (G) | N−(v) = ∅} denote the set
of roots of G. We construct an instance I = (R,H, {qh}h∈H , {pih}h∈H , {λr}r∈R)
as follows. For each v ∈ V (G), we have a mutually distinct resident rv and we
set R = {rv | v ∈ V (G)}. For each non-root vertex v ∈ V (G) \ V0, we have a
mutually distinct hospital hv and we set H = {hv | v ∈ V (G) \ V0}. For each
non-root vertex v ∈ V (G) \ V0, we set qhv = θ(v). For each non-root vertex
v ∈ V (G) \ V0, the preference list of hv lists ru, u ∈ N−(v), in the first |N−(v)|
places in an arbitrary order and then lists rv as its final element. For each root
v ∈ V0, the preference list of rv is empty (nothing disclosed). For each non-
root vertex v ∈ V (G) \ V0, the preference list of rv consists of a single entry hv
(only the top preference is disclosed). Finally, the match for which we ask the
finalizability is (rt, ht). It is straightforward to verify that I is resident-minimal
and that and (rt, ht) ∈ tent(I); in fact we have (rv, hv) ∈ tent(I) for every
v ∈ V (G)\V0. It is also clear that the quota of each hospital in I is k or smaller.
See Figure 3 for an example.
First suppose that G has a θ-firing F that contains t. We show that then
(rt, ht) is not finalizable in I. Let I
′ be obtained from I by adding hv at the end
of the preference list of ru in I, for each (u, v) ∈ F . Let v1, . . . , vn = t be a
topologically sorted enumeration of V (F ). We define I ′-feasible sequence σi, 0 ≤
i ≤ n, inductively as follows. We will maintain the induction hypothesis that σi
is I ′-feasible and tent(σi) = {(rvj , hvj ) | vj ∈ V (G)\V0 and j > i}∪{(rvj , hvk) |
j ≤ i and (vi, vk) ∈ E(F )}. Let σ0 be an arbitrary maximal I-feasible sequence.
Since I-feasibility implies I ′-feasibility and tent(I) = {(rv, hv) | v ∈ V (G)\V0},
the induction hypothesis holds for the base case. Suppose i > 0. If vi does not
have any outgoing edge in F then set σi = σi−1. Suppose vi has an outgoing
edge (vi, vk) in F . Because of the topological ordering, we have k > i. If vi ∈ V0,
then set σi = σi−1 + (rvi , hvk)
+. Since rvi 6∈ res tent(I) and hvk is ranked top
in the preference list of rvi in I
′, σi is I ′-feasible. The induction hypothesis is
maintained since we have (vi, vk) ∈ E(F ) and (rvi , hvk) ∈ tent(σi). On the other
hand, if vi ∈ V (F ) \ V0 then set σi = σi−1 + (rvi , hvi)− + (rvi , hvk)+. In this
case, the in-degree of vi in F is at least θ(vi) = qhvi . For each in-neighbor vj of
vi in F , its index j < i and, by the induction hypothesis, we have (rvj , hvi) ∈
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(a) DAG G for firing: the threshold equals the in-degree unless explicitly specified on
the shoulder
(b) The instance corresponding to G: the parenthesized numbers are quotas; tentative
matches are shown in bold face from both sides
(c) A θ-firing that contains t
(d) The instance extending the instance in (b) that corresponds to the firing in (c);
rejected matches are crossed out from both sides
Fig. 3. Reduction from 3-DAG-FIRING to the complement of 3-FTM-RM
tent(σi−1). Therefore, the preference list of hvi in I
′ has at least qhvi residents
in reshtent(σi−1) that precede rvi and therefore σ
′
i = σi−1 + (rvi , hvi)
− is I ′-
feasible. Moreover, since rvi ranks hvk immediately after hvi , σi = σ
′
i+(rvi , hvk)
+
is I ′-feasible. We also have tent(σi) = tent(σi−1)∪{(rvi , hvk)}\{(rvi , hvi)} and
therefore the induction hypothesis is maintained. This construction leads to a
I ′-feasible sequence σn that rejects (rt, rt). Therefore, (rt, ht) is not finalizable
in I.
For the converse, suppose (rt, ht) is not finalizable in I. Since I is resident-
minimal, by Theorem 2, there is some simple extension I ′ of I that rejects
(rt, ht). We assume without loss of generality that I
′ is resident-minimal: take
an appropriate truncation if not. Let U = V0∪{v ∈ V (G)\V0 | (rv, hv) ∈ rej(τ)}
and let F be the subgraph of G induced by U . We show that F is a θ-firing of G.
We first show that the out-degree of each vertex in F is at most 1. Let (u, v) be
an arbitrary edge of F . By the definition of G, ru precedes rv in the preference
list of hv in I. Since v ∈ U , (rv, hv) is rejected by τ , which implies that τ contains
the proposal of (r, hv) for every r that precedes rv in the preference list of hv
(recall that there are exactly qhv such residents r), including ru. Therefore, the
extension of the preference list of ru from I to I
′ is by hv. This show that, for
each u, the vertex v such that (u, v) is an edge of F is unique if one exists: the
out-degree of each vertex in F is at most 1.
We next show that the in-degree of each vertex v is at least θ(v). If v ∈ V0,
this is obvious since θ(v) = 0. Suppose v ∈ U \V0. Then, since τ rejects (rv, hv),
this rejection event must be preceded in τ by the proposal of (ru, hv) for every
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resident ru in the set of the qhv = θ(v) residents that precede rv in the preference
list of hv. But for each such resident ru, either u is in V0 (hence ru 6∈ res tent(I))
or the rejection of (ru, hu) precedes the proposal of (ru, hv) in τ . In either case,
we have u ∈ U . Therefore, the in-degree of v is in F is at least θ(v). We conclude
that F is a θ-firing of G. Since τ rejects (rt, ht), we have t ∈ U . This completes
the proof that if (rt, ht) is not finalizable then then there is a θ-firing of G that
contains t. uunionsq
5 A sufficient condition for finalizability
In this section, we introduce a polynomial-time decidable sufficient condition for
a match to be finalizable in a given instance. This condition turns out necessary
for resident-minimal instances in the stable marriage case, thus providing another
proof that 1-FTM-RM is polynomial time solvable (Theorem 4).
Let I be an instance and M a subset of tent(I). We say that r ∈ R is
relevant to h ∈ H with respect to M if r is matched in M either to h or to no
hospital. We say that a match (r, h) in M is endangered in M with respect to
I if it satisfies the following condition: if (r, h) ∈ tent(I) \ pend(I) then the
preference list of h in I contains qh or more residents before h that are relevant
to h with respect to M ; if (r, h) ∈ pend(I) then the number of residents relevant
to h with respect to M is qh + 1 or greater. We denote by dangI(M) the set
of endangered matches with respect to M in I. We say that the set M is safe
with respect to I if dangI(M) = ∅. Observe that dangI is monotone decreasing
in the following sense: if M ⊆ M ′ ⊆ tent(I) and (r, h) ∈ M \ dangI(M) then
(r, h) 6∈ dangI(M ′).
See Table 1 for an example.
Proposition 8. Let I be an instance and suppose M ⊆ tent(I) is safe with
respect to I. Then, every match in M is finalizable in I.
Proof. Let σ be an arbitrary feasible extension of the maximal I-feasible se-
quence. Let τ be the maximal prefix of σ that does not contain the rejection
of any member of M . Since M ⊆ tent(I), τ is an extension of the maximal
I-feasible sequence. Since M ⊆ tent(I) and τ does not reject any match in M ,
we have M ⊆ tent(τ) and hence dangI(tent(τ)) ⊆ dangI(M) = ∅ by the
monotonicity of dangI observed above and the assumption that M is safe. This
means that there is no match (r, h) in M such that τ + (r, h)− is feasible, since
if there is such a match then it would be endangered in tent(τ) with respect to
I. Therefore, τ must be equal to σ and therefore there is no extension of I that
rejects any match in M . uunionsq
Theorem 6. Let I be an instance. Then, the maximal safe set with respect to
I is unique and can be identified in polynomial time.
Proof. Let M0 = tent(I) and Mi = Mi−1 \ dangI(Mi−1) for i > 0. Let m be
the smallest i such that Mi = Mi+1. Since dangI(Mm) = ∅, Mm is safe. To
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Table 1. An example of a safe set
Preference list pih of each h ∈ H
Matches in tent(I) are in bold face
Matches in M , a safe set, are parenthesized
h 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
X (a) i e (c) b f d - -
Y i (g) a (b) d e c - -
Z e b g a (i) d - - -
Preference list of relevant residents for each h
Each member of M is within the quota of 3 in these lists
h 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
X (a) e (c) f d - -
Y (g) (b) d e c - -
Z e (i) d - - -
Preference list of each r ∈
R; matches in tent(I)
are in bold face; rejected
matches are in braces;
r 1st 2nd 3rd
a X - -
b Y X -
c {Y} X -
d {X} - -
e Y X -
f {Y} X -
g {X} Y -
h {Y} - -
i Z - -
show its maximality, let M be an arbitrary subset of tent(I) that is safe with
respect to I. We show by induction on i that M ⊆ Mi. The base case i = 0 is
trivial. Suppose i > 0. By the induction hypothesis, M ⊆ Mi−1. Let (r, h) be a
match in dangI(Mi−1). We cannot have (r, h) ∈M , since if we did then, by the
monotonicity of dangI , (r, h) would be endangered in M , a contradiction to the
assumption that M is safe. Therefore, dangI(Mi−1)∩M = ∅ and hence M ⊆Mi
holds. Therefore we have M ⊆ Mm and hence Mm is the unique maximal safe
set. uunionsq
In the stable marriage resident-minimal case, the above sufficient condition
for finalizability turns out necessary as well.
Theorem 7. Let I be a resident-minimal instance in the stable marriage case.
Then, each (r, h) ∈ tent(I) is finalizable only if it is in the maximal safe set
with respect to I.
Proof. Fix I and let Mi, 0 ≤ i ≤ m, be as defined in the proof of Theorem 6.
In particular, Mm is the maximal safe set with respect to I. Fix an arbitrary
match (r, h) ∈ tent(I) \Mm. We show that (r, h) is not finalizable.
Let i be the smallest integer such that (r, h) 6∈ Mi. Since (r, h) ∈ M0 =
tent(I), we have i > 0. We construct a sequence of matches (r, h) = (ri, hi),
(ri−1, hi−1), . . . , (r0, h0) such that (rj , hj) ∈ dangI(Mj−1) for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ i.
Let 0 < j < i and suppose (rk, hk) ∈ dangI(Mk−1) for i ≥ k > j has
been determined. As (rj+1, hj+1) ∈ dangI(Mj), we have some resident, say rj ,
that is relevant to hj+1 with respect to Mj and precedes rj+1 in the preference
list of hj+1 in I. Observe here that we cannot have (rj+1, hj+1) ∈ pend(I)
since if we had then (rj+1, hj+1) would be in dangI(M0) and hence not in
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dangI(Mj) ⊆ Mj as j ≥ 1. Now, rj is relevant to hj+1 with respect to Mj but
not with respect to Mj−1 since (rj+1, hj+1) is not in dangI(Mj−1). Therefore,
there is some hospital, say hj , distinct from hj+1 such that (rj , hj) ∈ Mj−1 \
Mj = dangI(Mj−1). Thus, we have determined (rj , hj) ∈ dangI(Mj−1) for the
current j and, inductively, for each j, i ≥ j ≥ 1.
As observed above, we have (rj , hj) ∈ tent(I) \ pend(I) for i ≥ j ≥ 1 and,
since I is a stable marriage instance, hj for i ≥ j ≥ 1 are pairwise distinct.@More
straightforwardly, rj for i ≥ j ≥ 1 are pairwise distinct as there is at most one
match in tent(I) involving a particular resident.
Let σ be a maximal I-feasible sequence. We now construct successive ex-
tensions I1, . . . , Im of I and successive extensions σ1, . . . , σm of σ, based
on the sequence of matches constructed above. Since (r1, h1) ∈ dangI(M0) =
dangI(tent(I)), either (r1, h1) ∈ pend(I) or (r1, h1) ∈ tent(I) \ pend(I). If
(r1, h1) ∈ pend(I) then let I1 be obtained from I by completing the preference
list of h1 so that r1 is ranked lowest and let σ1 = σ + (r1, h1)
−. Suppose oth-
erwise that (r1, h1) ∈ tent(I) \ pend(I) then, since (r1, h1) is endangered in
tent(I) with respect to I, there must be some resident, say r0, that precedes r1
in the preference list of h1 in I and is relevant to h1 with respect to tent(I).
The latter condition implies that (r0, h1) 6∈ tent(I). Moreover, (r0, h1) is not
in prop(I) since if it were then it would be impossible for (r1, h1) to be in
tent(I). Since I is resident-minimal, it follows that h1 is not in the preference
list of r0. We let I1 be obtained from I by appending h1 to the preference list
of r0 and let σ1 = σ + (r0, h1)
+ + (r1, h1)
−. In either case, σ1 is I1-feasible. In
general, we maintain the invariant that (rj , hj) ∈ rej(σj) and σj is Ij-feasible
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Suppose j > 1 and Ij−1 together with σj−1 has been de-
fined. Let Ij be obtained from Ij−1 by appending hj to the preference list of
rj−1 and let σj = σj−1 + (rj−1, hj)+ + (rj , hj)−. As (rj−1, hj−1) ∈ rej(σj−1),
σj−1 + (rj−1, hj)+ is Ij-feasible. Moreover, since rj−1 precedes rj in the prefer-
ence list of hj by constructin, σj is Ij-feasible. We conclude that (r, h) = (rm, hm)
is not finalizable in I since the extension Im of I rejects (rm, hm). uunionsq
It follows as a corollary to Proposition 8, Theorem 6, and Theorem 7 that
1-FTM-RM is polynomial time solvable giving another proof of Theorem 4.
6 Student-supervisor assignment: simulations
In this section, we present some simulation results on the student-supervisor
assignment procedure mentioned in the introduction. The purpose is to demon-
strate that there are realistic markets in which multi-round matching procedures
based on FTM can be effective. Since the statics from the real market are not
publicly disclosable, we resort to simulations.
Real market
We first describe the real student-supervisor market in the author’s department.
Every student in the final year of undergraduate study takes a full year project
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course as a part of the requirement for graduation. Every faculty member in
the department supervises a project course. Supervisors have quotas as even as
possible that sum up to the total number of students. The assignment procedure
takes place in the following steps.
1. Students visit supervisors’ labs to see the research activity there and get
interviews if interested.
2. Each supervisor submits a rank list of students to the central system. This
list must be complete. The grade point information is provided to the super-
visors. Typically, supervisors make their rank list based on the grade points
and the score from the interviews.
3. The rank lists of the supervisors are not public but are partially disclosed in
the following manner: if the rank of student s in the list of supervisor p is
within the quota of p, then s is notified of this fact.
4. The first round of matching: each student submits a rank list of length up
to 3 and the deferred acceptance algorithm is executed. Among the result-
ing tentative matches, those found finalizable by the sufficient condition in
Section 5 are finalized. Both the student and the supervisor of each finalized
match are notified.
5. Each student s without a finalized match is informed of the following: (1)
the list of unfilled supervisors (supervisors for which the number of final-
ized matches is strictly smaller than their quota) and (2) the list of unfilled
supervisors p such that the rank of s in the rank list of p, after removing
students who are finalized to supervisors other than p, is within the quota
of p. Note that, in the circumstances in (2), s must be matched to p in any
stable matching provided that s ranks p the highest among all supervisors
except those that rejected s in the first round.
6. The second round of matching: each student without a finalized match sub-
mit a complete rank list of unfilled supervisors. This rank list must be con-
sistent with the rank list in the first round, in that they agree on the ordering
of common entries. Then the deferred acceptance algorithm is executed to
complete the assignment.
The final outcome of the two rounds of matching is stable, assuming that the
rank lists of students in both rounds are consistent with their true preferences.
This assumption might be disputable because of the partial disclosures of the
supervisors’ rank lists before each round, described above. There is no strategic
reason for students to change their preference orders but there may be psycho-
logical factors. Though these disclosures are introduced for good reasons, we do
not include this ingredient in our simulation, partly because we want to avoid
such disputes and partly because it is difficult to model the influence of such
disclosures on the preferences of students.
Model
We have a set S of students and a set P of supervisors. To model the diversity
of interests of students and of attractiveness of the supervisors, we have a set T
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of topics. Besides |S|, |P |, |T | we have parameters k, σ1, σ2, and σ3 to be used
below.
We have the following random variables, which are mutually independent
except for the relationships explicitly described. Each s ∈ S has a score gs which
has a normal distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation σ1. Each stu-
dent s ∈ S has an interest value is,t on each topic t ∈ T and each supervisor p
has attractiveness ap,t on each topic t ∈ T . For each student s, the total interest∑
t ∈ Tis,t is fixed to 1 and the relative magnitude of is,t, t ∈ T , is proportional
to a random variable with mean 0.5 and standard deviation σ3. For each super-
visor p, the total attractiveness
∑
t ∈ Tap,t has a normal distribution with mean
1 and standard deviation σ2, truncated to fit in the interval [0.5, 1.5]. Given this
total attractiveness, the relative magnitude of ap,t, t ∈ T , is proportional to a
random variable with mean 0.5 and standard deviation σ3.
Based on these random variables, the rank lists of students and supervi-
sors are determined a follows. For each pair of student s and supervisor p, let
attraction(s, p) = σt∈T is,tap,t denote the attraction between s and p, which
is the inner product between the interest vector is of s and the attractiveness
vector ap of p.
Each student s uses attraction(s, p) as a score to rank p in the list. The rank
lists of supervisors are based on the grade scores of students and the results
of interviews described as follows. Each student s has interviews with top k
supervisors in the rank list of s. The score supervisor p uses to rank student s
is the grade score gs if p does not interview s. If p does interview s, then the
score is modified to reflect the chemistry catalyzed by the interview. We use a
simplest model that the score in this case is gs + attraction(s, p).
Procedure
The procedure has a parameter r, a positive integer. In the first round, the top
r of the rank list of each student are submitted and the deferred acceptance
algorithm is executed on this truncated instance. Among the resulting tentative
matches, those found finalizable by the the sufficient condition in Section 5 are
finalized. We count the number of tentative matches, the number of finalized
matches, and the number of supervisors that are completely filled by the finalized
matches in the first round.
The second round could be executed using the complete rank lists but, in
this study, we are not interested in the final outcomes.
Simulation results
In our simulation, we set |S| = 100 and |P | = 10, round numbers which are
close to the real numbers in the author’s department. We also fix the following
parameters: |T | = 4, k = 5, r = 3, and σ1 = σ2 = 0.1. We try several values
of parameter σ3, which controls the degree of diversity of the interests of the
students and of the attractiveness of supervisors.
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We have run the simulation 100 times for each value of σ3 and recorded the
average, minimum, and maximum values of each quantity measured. Table 2
shows the results.
σ3 tentative matches finalized matches finalized/tentative filled supervisors
avg. min max avg. min max avg. min max avg. min max
0.1 40.16 30 55 35.72 30 50 0.89 0.71 1.0 3.7 3.0 5.0
0.3 73.57 51 91 67.49 44 88 0.91 0.78 1.0 6.29 4.0 8.0
0.5 82.02 64 94 77.37 58 93 0.94 0.82 1.0 7.08 6.0 9.0
0.7 82.81 69 96 78.68 62 91 0.94 0.81 1.0 7.2 6.0 9.0
Table 2. Simulation results
As σ3 increases, both the number of tentative matches and the number of
finalized matches tend to increase, except that the results for σ3 = 0.5 and
σ3 = 0.7 do not show a significant difference. This tendency is plausible, since
the diversity of interests and attractiveness would result in the diversity of pref-
erences.
It might be rather surprising that the ratio of the number of finalized matches
over the number of tentative matches is consistently high: on average, it is around
or above 90% for all values of σ3.
With high diversity of interests and attractiveness (σ3 = 0.5, for example),
on average, about 77 students out of 100 are finalized after the first round and
about 7 supervisors out of 10 are filled with finalized matches.
These numbers are fairly close to those from the real supervisor assignment
results in the author’s department. Thus, the savings in the evaluation efforts of
the students are enormous. The students finalized in the first round do not need
to extend their list beyond the top 3 supervisors and those who are not finalized
may concentrate on the small number of unfilled supervisors in the second round.
We do not claim that our model captures the underlying mechanism of the
real market well. In particular, the model for the effect of interviews is too
simplistic. Nonetheless, the simulations do demonstrate that multi-round stable
matching procedure based on FTM can be effective for markets where the prefer-
ences of participants are diverse and some prematch process, such as interviews,
helps nurturing ties between some pairs through which each side of a pair ranks
the other high.
7 Future work
Though the sufficient condition for finalizability given in Section 5 is useful in
matching procedures for markets as studied in Section 6, exact determination
of finalizability, if can be done with a reasonable amount of computation, would
further enhance the merit of the multi-round approach. The characterization of
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negative instances for FTM-RM given in Section 4 would be indispensable in
developing practical algorithms for exact finalizability.
Applicability of the approach to larger markets such as NRMP is an inter-
esting and challenging topic.
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